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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in employment. During the last fifteen years, the courts have
extended this prohibition to include sexual harassment. 2 While the
first plaintiffs to bring Title VII sexual harassment claims met with a
good deal of skepticism, current law recognizes that such behavior is
actionable under Title VII. In 1980, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission amended its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex to include sexual harassment and helped solidify judicial accept-
ance of this cause of action. 3
In the 1970s and 80s, women entered the workplace in ever in-
creasing numbers, and the women's movement raised the issue of
women's putative subjection to men with ever greater vehemence.
Not surprisingly, society now considers intolerable everything from
sexual threats and reprisals to insults, innuendos, and sexual humor
that were once passively borne by women. Women have triggered
male resentment by simultaneously assuming new roles of authority
in business and the professions and invading the formerly secure
blue-collar bastions of men (e.g., coal mines, construction sites, po-
lice precincts). This resentment, coupled with the greater interac-
tion between men and women in the workplace, has no doubt added
to the incidence of sexual harassment.
Courts and commentators distinguish two types of sexual harass-
ment. The classic form, called quid pro quo sexual harassment, in-
volves a male supervisor who extorts sexual favors from a female
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1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified an amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e 2000e-17 (1982)).
2. The ensuing discussion will be limited to sexual harassment in the employment
context. Relationships other than employer (or agent) and employee that have elicited
similar complaints are professor/student and apartment manager/tenant.
3. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
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subordinate in exchange for job benefits, and retaliates if she de-
murs. The other form is hostile environment sexual harassment-a sit-
uation in which harassing conduct, either by supervisors or co-
workers, has the effect of "unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.14 Hostile environment sweeps rather
broadly. It can encompass anything from the verbal and pictorial
(crude language, lewd pictures placed on co-workers' desks, sexual
limericks inscribed on bathroom stalls, off-color jokes) to offensive
physical acts (touching, brushing against, grabbing, indecent
exposure).
For the purposes of this Article, it will be helpful first to provide a
fuller definition of 'sexual harassment.' Most commentators assume
that sexual harassment involves men doing something objectionable
to women-although they usually concede that the genders of har-
asser and victim could be reversed, or that a member of one sex
could harass another of that same sex. Other more zealous par-
tisans, however, inject male abuse of power and economic privilege
into the very definition of sexual harassment. Catharine A. MacKin-
non5 is perhaps the best known proponent of this view. Her hugely
influential book, much quoted by judges and commentators, Sexual
Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination, begins:
Intimate violation of women by men is sufficiently pervasive in Ameri-
can society as to be nearly invisible. Contained by internalized and
structural forms of power, it has been nearly inaudible. Conjoined
with men's control over women's material survival . . . it has become
institutionalized .... Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers
to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of
power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or impose dep-
rivations in another. . . .American society legitimizes male sexual
dominance of women and employer's control of workers.... Sexual
harassment of women in employment is particularly clear when male
superiors on the job coercively initiate unwanted sexual advances to
women employees. 6
4. Id. § 1604.11(a).
5. MacKinnon, arguably the leading force in articulating sexual harassment as an
illegitimate burden placed upon women in the workplace, will be discussed at greater
length in Section 11(B). See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
6. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION 1-2 (1979). Others advance definitions that incorporate the male.as-of-
fender assumption: See also, L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WOMEN ON THE JOB 14-15 (1978):
Sexual harassment is best described as unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that




Incorporating abuse of power into the definition, however, seems
unduly limiting. While it mirrors accurately what transpires in the
classic quid pro quo situation, it reflects only uneasily hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment by co-workers-unless one accepts the
added, debatable, and more global assumption that males occupy-
ing any position in the workplace enjoy more power than women. If
one favored such a claim, arguing for it directly, rather than import-
ing it into the very definition of sexual harassment (thus begging the
question and, perhaps, alienating those who might be sympathetic
to the complaint but not the assumption), seems desirable.
I prefer a neutral definition of sexual harassment to MacKinnon's,
which injects an ideological bias against men and the capitalist mar-
ketplace. 7 This definition would eschew, as too confining, an impli-
cation of abuse of power. The EEOC's Guidelines proffer such a
neutral definition (in the employment context), and since this regu-
latory instrument proved so important in shaping the development
of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, it will suffice:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or im-
plicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submis-
sion to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. 8
Without gainsaying that behavior that falls within the rubric of
sexual harassment is both reprehensible and widespread, this Arti-
cle will examine some of the doctrinal anomalies in the sexual har-
assment as sexual discrimination paradigm. The first section will
survey the current legal landscape. Section II will expose some
problems with the sexual harassment paradigm, and Section III will
adumbrate a more coherent and useful model for handling sexual
harassment claims.
This model would replace the defective Title VII paradigm with a
new tort remedy for sexual harassment. This tort would have sev-
eral advantages over Title VII: it would provide damages to a
harmed individual as an individual, rather than as a member of a
women at work arose out of man's need to maintain his control of female labor.
This tactic of nonreciprocal aggression is a major element in the maintenance ofjob
segregation by sex.
7. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
8. Guidelines, supra note 3, at § 1604.11(a).
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protected group, thus preserving the nexus between offender and
victim; it would place liability for the harm on the responsible party,
not on a usually non-blameworthy employer, as "deep pockets"
considerations and Title VII doctrine currently do; and, finally, it
would provide damages more robust than Title VII permits.
This proposal emanates from the 'individual-rights perspective,'
whi'h differs markedly from the 'group-rights perspective' MacKin-
non endorses. Focusing on individual rights is more compatible
with our political and constitutional heritage and more congruent
with the "color-blind" ideal embodied in the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
I. The Legal Landscape
Title VII prohibits employers of fifteen or more workers from dis-
criminating in their hiring, promotion, and firing procedures. It
reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 9
Title VII established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) and charged it with investigating complaints of dis-
crimination and then attempting conciliation. The EEOC may bring
a civil suit against an employer' 0 when it cannot otherwise resolve
the issue, or it may issue a "right to sue" letter to the aggrieved
individual who may then pursue his or her complaint in the courts." t
If the court finds that the employer has "intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice," the
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
10. This power of repairing to the courts was given to the Attorney General in the
original title. However, in 1972 Congress amended Title VII, and one result was that
the EEOC also received the power to pursue "pattern or practice" suits in the courts.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 241, 311-12 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982)).
11. It should be noted that sexual harassment cases reach the federal courts-as in
all other Title VII litigation by individual plaintiffs-only after an unsuccessful attempt
by the EEOC (or an appropriate state equal employment agency) to eliminate the prob-
lem through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." EEOC
Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1989). If the EEOC itself declines to
pursue the matter in court, it issues a "right to sue" notice to the complainant, who is




court may enjoin the offending practice and order appropriate "af-
firmative action," including reinstatement, back pay, or other appro-
priate equitable relief. Punitive damages, however, are not
currently available.' 2
As Title VII litigation progressed in the courts, judges articulated
two theories of analysis: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Dis-
parate treatment requires proof of intentional discrimination, and is
tied intimately to the language of Title VII and the amelioration of
infractions against individual members of a protected group. Dispa-
rate impact theory attempts to eliminate practices that appear
facially neutral but work to the disadvantage of protected groups.
For both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment,
courts use disparate treatment theory.
The Supreme Court sketched out the framework for establishing a
Title VII disparate treatment claim in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,' 3 a 1973 racial discrimination case brought by a black man.
The plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.1 4
The Court noted that, in Title VII cases, the facts may vary, and thus
the specifications for proof of a prima facie case may also vary. 15
The burden then shifts to the employer "to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' 6 If
the defendant succeeds in articulating such a reason, the plaintiff
then can show that the employer's stated reason was pretextual. Af-
ter some confusion in the lower courts about the precise burden
that "to articulate" places on defendants, the Court, in a 1981 sex-
ual discrimination case, attempted to clarify the shifting burdens
placed on the two parties, and particularly the "intermediate" bur-
den placed on the defendant. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Civil Rights Act of 1990,
H.R. 4000 and S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. See CONG. REC. 1018 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1990) seeks to change this by allowing for punitive and compensatory damages under
Title VII. Id at § 8.
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. Id. at 802.
15. Id. at 802, n.13.
16. Id. at 802.
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Burdine,'7 Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, empha-
sized that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff re-
mains at all times with the plaintiff."' 8 By establishing a prima facie
case, the plaintiff creates a presumption that the employer unlaw-
fully discriminated against her. The burden then shifts to the de-
fendant to rebut this presumption by presenting evidence that the
employment decision was made for legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons. If the defendant carries this "burden of production" (i.e., not
a stronger burden of persuasion as the Court of Appeals had erro-
neously imposed' 9), the plaintiff must then persuade the court that
the proffered reason was merely pretextual. 20
Quid pro quo sexual harassment emerged earliest as a legitimate
cause of action under Title VII's ban on sexual discrimination in
employment. Initially, however, the courts did not recognize even
quid pro quo scenarios-the most egregious instances of sexual
malfeasance by supervisory employees. District courts that heard
the early cases almost unanimously said that sexual harassment fell
outside practices proscribed by the Civil Rights Act.2' Many judges
did not believe that employers should be held liable-as employers
are held liable for the acts of their agents under Title VII-for sex-
ual overtures by their supervisory employees that the judges viewed
as essentially personal in nature.
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 22 decided in 1975, is typical of the early
breed. Two female plaintiffs claimed that they were forced to resign
when verbal and physical sexual advances from their supervisor be-
came too onerous to tolerate. Judge Frey held that even if their alle-
gations were true, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
under Title VII. Previous unlawful employment practice cases all
raised issues of objectionable policies that "arose out of company
policies," where these policies-job assignment, fringe benefits,
pregnancy restrictions, or limitations on the employment of married
17. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
18. l at 253.
19. Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979).
vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1980) (defendant must prove, by a preponderance of evidence,
that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons existed for the discharge).
20. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-57.
21. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976);
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb,
390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123
(D.D.C. 1974). But see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).




women-in some sense benefited the employer. The instant case,
he argued, departed from this established pattern:
[The] conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity,
peculiarity or mannerism... satisfying a personal urge. Certainly no
employer policy is here involved; rather than the company being bene-
fited in any way by the conduct of Price [the supervisor], it is obvious it
can only be damaged by the very nature of the acts complained of 2 3
The court noted that the legislative history did not indicate an
intent to include sexual harassment under Title VII; indeed, "sex"
was a last minute addition to the Title. 24 Nothing in the Act, Judge
Frey continued, could reasonably be construed to cover verbal and
physical sexual advances even by a supervisor to another employee,
"where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to
the nature of the employment." 25 If a supervisor directed his sexual
advances equally at men and women, clearly no basis for suit under
Title VII would exist. Thus, he found it "ludicrous" to assume that
the Act was designed to cover the instant activities. Deciding other-
wise, he feared, would open the floodgates to federal lawsuits
"devery time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented ad-
vances towards another."'26
Come sounded themes common to the early cases: (1) nothing in
its legislative history would justify reading Title VII to include sex-
ual harassment; (2) employers ought not be held liable for the ac-
tions of supervisors that fall outside the scope of their employment
and may even be proscribed by the employer;27 (3) sexual advances
and propositions by supervisors are essentially private acts; 28
23. Id. at 163.
24. The amendment was added by an opponent of the act who intended thereby to
torpedo the entire business. One judge would later remark that the amendment was
intended as a "joke." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D.
Mich. 1984).
25. Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
26. Id
27. E.g., Millerv. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (court
declined to find employer liability where employer had policy of disciplining employees
for sexual abuses and plaintiff failed to notify company).
28. E.g., id at 234. The court asked "whether Title VII was intended to hold an
employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of
one employee to another (citations omitted)." It concluded that:
The attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex phenome-
non and it is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most person-
nel decisions. Such being the case, it would seem wise for the Court to refrain from
delving into these matters short of specific factual allegations describing an em-
ployer policy which in its application imposes or permits a consistent, as distin-
guished from isolated, sex-based discrimination on a definable employee group.
Id at 236.
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(4) sexual harassment of a female is not sex discrimination as con-
templated by Title VII because the same actions could have been
made by a woman to a man or a man to a man, and thus the gender
of each party is "incidental to the claim of abuse"; 29 and (5) a con-
trary reading of Title VII would invite numerous, and by implica-
tion, frivolous suits.30
The Come trend proved short lived. The next year, in Williams v.
Saxbe,3 1 the district court for the District of Columbia accepted the
claim of sexual harassment as sex discrimination. The court re-
jected the notion that gender was irrelevant to the sexual harass-
ment complaint of a female employee who declined the sexual
advances of a supervisor and consequently was dismissed. Analo-
gizing sexual harassment to employment practices previously con-
demned under Title VII, such as discrimination against married
women or women with school-age children, Judge Richey argued
that the employment "rule" (i.e., the harassment) created an artifi-
cial barrier to the employment of one gender and not the other.3 2
The judge rejected as well the contention that the supervisor's acts
did not constitute a policy or practice of the company but rather an
isolated personal incident: "If this was a policy or practice of plain-
tiff's supervisor, then it was the agency's policy or practice, which is
prohibited by Title VII." 33
The circuit courts now agree that quid pro quo sexual harassment
suits fall under the Title VII 'disparate treatment' model. The plain-
tiff first must establish a prima facie case34 of unlawful discrimina-
tion; the employer may then produce evidence of a legitimate
29. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.NJ. 1976). Judge Stem
argued that the purpose of Title VII was to remove artificial barriers to employment that
resulted from "unjust and long-encrusted prejudice": "It is not intended to provide a
federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire on
the part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather than
a back alley." Id
30. Four of these themes enunciated in Come, will be treated at greater length in
Section II: legislative intent in Section II(A), see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text; employer liability in Section II(C), see infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text;
private acts versus group injury in Section II(B), see infra notes 61-74 and accompanying
text; whether gender is incidental in Section II(B), see infra notes 76-80 and accompany-
ing text.
31. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.G. 1976).
32. Id at 659. This reasoning seems strained since the sexual harassment was,
clearly, not a "rule," as the judge argued it was.
33. Id. at 663.
34. The elements that a plaintiff must establish for a prima facie case of sexual har-
assment have been variously described. In Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603 n. I
(7th Cir. 1985), the court said that the "burden is not onerous" in making out a prima
facie case, and that Horn had done so by showing that "she was discharged under cir-




reason for the offending action (usually a discharge in these sexual
harassment cases); and the plaintiff finally must rebut that presump-
tion of legitimacy and establish that she (or he) was discharged for
refusing sexual advances.3 5 Plaintiffs must show that they suffered a
tangible economic detriment as a result of the harassment (e.g., dis-
charge, constructive discharge, demotion, etc.). Remedies are lim-
ited, as in all Title VII suits, to equitable relief, such as back pay, an
injunction (perhaps directing the employer to establish a grievance
procedure), and reinstatement. In accordance with the EEOC Guide-
lines, courts hold employers strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual
harassment by their supervisory personnel.3 6
Courts recognized hostile environment sexual harassment later
than the more clear-cut quid pro quo variety. Modeled after cases
involving racially hostile environments, 37 this type of harassment re-
sults in a claim of psychological rather than directly pecuniary
harm-although many plaintiffs contend that as a result of the har-
assment they felt pressured to quit their jobs. The objectionable
behavior can be perpetrated either by supervisors (but without the
direct causal nexus of offensive conduct to economic loss seen in
quid pro quo harassment) or co-workers. Plaintiffs have complained
of the following sorts of acts: sexual inquiries of a personal nature,
vulgarities, requests for sexual relations;38 nonconsensual touching,
schemes have been suggested. Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search For Standards in the
Law of Sexual Harassment," 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721 (1989). Vinciguerra, the author of the
note, describes five elements to be established for a prima fade case: the plaintiff be-
longs to a protected class; she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; the harass-
ment was based on sex; the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and her employer is liable. This scheme was clearly stated with the same
five prongs in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11 th Cir. 1982).
35. E.g., Horn, 755 F.2d at 603 n.1.
36. Id at 604. "Every circuit that has reached the issue has adopted the EEOC's rule
imposing strict liability on employers for the acts of sexual harassment committed by
their supervisory employees."
37. The first case to recognize hostile environment sexual harassment as a legitimate
cause of action under Title VII was Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In
Bundy, Judge Wright explicitly tied the hostile environment sexual harassment claim to
the racially hostile environment model first recognized in Rogers v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
Judge Wright wrote: "Bundy's claim.., is essentially that 'conditions of employment'
include the psychological and emotional work environment.... This claim invokes the
Title VII principle enunciated by Judge Goldberg in Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Com'n. [sic]" 641 F.2d at 944. See also Henson, 682 F.2d at 901-02 (the court opined,
after quoting Rogers, that "[slexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive envi-
ronment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality"); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (Court applied racial hostile environment analysis to
sexual harassment).
38. Henson, 682 F. 2d at 899.
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rubbing, and grabbing, and harassing telephone calls;39 occasional
displays of pictures of nude or partially clad women in the office; 40
obscene cartoons of the victim displayed in the men's room;4' ob-
scene drawings, crude language, and indecent exposure.42
Henson v. City of Dundee,43 decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 1982,
became the leading case (prior to the Supreme Court's single ven-
ture into the sexual harassment domain some five years later) to set
out the parameters of the hostile environment cause of action under
Title VII. The Henson court established five elements that the plain-
tiff must prove: (1) she (or he) belongs to a protected group; (2) she
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the sense that she
did nothing to solicit or incite the conduct and found it "undesir-
able and offensive"; 44 (3) the harassment was based on sex ("but
for" her sex she would not have been harassed);45 (4) the harass-
ment affected a "'term, condition, or privilege of employment' ";46
(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take prompt remedial action.47 The sexual harassment suf-
fered must be "sufficiently pervasive" and must seriously affect the
psychological well-being of the victim to satisfy the fourth prong.48
39. Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (D. Neb. 1983) (company
was not liable for co-worker sexual harassment that occurred on a business trip because,
once apprised, the employer acted swiftly to rectify the problem with disciplinary
action).
40. Rabidue v. Osce6la Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
41. Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1988).
42. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
43. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 903.
45. Here the judge makes the point that if a supervisor makes sexual overtures to-
wards members of both sexes, the sexual harassment would not be based on sex and
hence would not fall under Title VII. d. at 904.
46. Id. The language is drawn directly from Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
47. The court in Henson delineated a knowledge requirement for employer liability in
hostile environment cases:
Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer responsible for the hostile
environment created by the plaintiff's supervisor or co-worker, she must show that
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed
to take prompt remedial action. The employee can demonstrate that the employer
knew of the harassment by showing that she complained to higher management of
the harassment, or by showing the pervasiveness of the harassment, which gives rise
to the inference of knowledge or constructive knowledge.
682 F.2d at 905 (citations omitted).
Henson stands for a different standard of employer liability in quid pro quo cases (strict
liability) than in hostile environment cases (liability when management knew or should
have known). Id at 910. The elements of a prima facie case have been stated somewhat
less rigorously in other circuits, but they are roughly equivalent. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1983).
48. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
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In contrast to the "strict liability" imposed on employers under quid
pro quo theory, the fifth prong incorporates a knowledge standard:
either the employer must have been informed of the offensive con-
duct and failed to take remedial action, or the employer is presumed
to have constructive knowledge of the behavior because the conduct
is so pervasive as to permeate the workplace. 49 The shifting burdens
of proof in hostile environment cases emulate the standard Title VII
disparate treatment formula: the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case (as outlined above), the employer produces evidence that the
harassment either never took place or was trivial and infrequent,
and the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 50 the Supreme Court gave official
blessing to what had been going on in the lower courts for a decade.
The Court declared that sexual harassment is sex discrimination,
which is actionable under Tide VII when it is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment.' "51
Although embracing most of the EEOC's Guidelines, the Court in
Vinson declined to settle differences among the lower courts over the
appropriate standard for employer liability in hostile environment
cases in which the perpetrator is a supervisor.52 Justice Rehnquist
noted the debate between the district court and the Court of Ap-
peals over the appropriate liability standard. The former concluded
49. Some courts have found the EEOC Guidelines too harsh in their treatment of em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment of the hostile environment sort in those instances
where the harasser is the employee's supervisor. Rather than strict liability, as the Guide-
lines instruct, these courts prefer that the more lenient standard for co-workers' harass-
ment be applied to supervisors: a standard of knowledge or constructive knowledge.
The reasons, although never clearly stated, seem to be that courts think that hostile
environment suits are more likely to be frivolous and that the employer is less likely to
know what is going on in these instances. Neither reason seems particularly persuasive.
The EEOC Guidelines on hostile environment harassment read as follows: "With respect
to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual har-
assment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action." Guidelines, supra note 3, at § 1604.11(d).
50. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
51. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
52. Compare Ferguson v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1198-9 (D.
Del. 1983) (court rejected EEOC Guidelines and found that "on the facts presented" em-
ployer must have actual or constructive knowledge in order to be held liable for hostile
environment sexual harassment by supervisors) and Henson, 682 F.2d at 910 with Vinson
v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Vinson v. Taylor the court accepted
the Guidelines on employer liability and, thus, rejected a knowledge or constructive
knowledge standard for hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors. The
court argued that the latter standard would eviscerate Title VII by encouraging employ-
ers to remain oblivious to offenses and would limit vicarious liability only to employers
who failed to take action against a known evil.
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that since the bank did not have notice of the alleged offensive con-
duct, it could not be held liable; the latter said that the employer
should be held strictly liable for the hostile environment harassment
perpetrated by its supervisor, despite the fact that the employer
neither "knew nor reasonably could have known of the alleged mis-
conduct."53 Given that the facts in the case were too inconclusive
for the Court to issue a "definitive rule" on employer liability, the
Court urged, instead, that lower courts look to common-law agency
principles. 54 Justice Rehnquist cited relevant portions of the Restate-
ment of Agency. Section 219, which states that employers are not lia-
ble for the torts of their "servants acting outside the scope of their
employment," seems most pertinent.5 5 Employers could argue (as
they have from the earliest cases) that the harassment occurred
outside the scope of employment: either the venue was non-busi-
ness related or the supervisor exceeded his authority or contra-
vened company policy.
Curiously-or perhaps not so curiously given the changes in both
party and ideology that transpired between 1980 and 1986-the
EEOC in its amicus brief argued for a knowledge standard for all
hostile environment cases, both when the offender is a supervisor
and when he is a co-worker. The Commission took this position
despite its own rule that employers are strictly liable for hostile envi-
ronment acts by supervisors and only liable on a lesser knowledge
or constructive knowledge standard when co-workers perpetrate
such acts. The Court, while declining to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability, held that the Court of Appeals erred in conclud-
ing that employers are always strictly liable for sexual harassment by
their supervisors, but that absence of notice by the plaintiff to the
employer does not necessarily preclude employer liability.5 6
The Court, however, did articulate a distinction that the lower
court had not grasped fully. Justice Rehnquist, consistent with the
EEOC Guidelines, contended that the "gravamen" of sexual harass-
ment claims is that the sexual advances were unwelcome. While the
district court had found the plaintiff's actions to be voluntary be-
cause the plaintiff had had intercourse with her supervisor forty to
53. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69-70.
54. Id at 72.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
56. The reason for the latter conclusion was that grievance procedures can be faulty;
in this case, for example, Vinson would have had to complain first to her supervisor who




fifty times,57 Justice Rehnquist argued that succumbing to sexual
threats ought not bar the plaintiff from claiming that the ensuing
sexual activity was unwelcome.58
In short, then, sexual harassment is now a well-established cause
of action under Title VII. Courts follow-with modifications to fit
the peculiar circumstances that set sexual harassment cases apart
from standard sexual discrimination suits-the disparate treatment
framework for establishing employment discrimination. Sexual har-
assment cases fall into two broad and sometimes overlapping cate-
gories: quid pro quo harassment, in which the victim suffers an
economic deprivation as the direct result of refusing the sexual ad-
vances of her supervisor; and hostile environment harassment, in
which the victim endures various sorts of abuse of a sex-charged
nature from either a supervisor or co-workers. While the courts
have imposed strict liability on employers for quid pro quo miscon-
duct by supervisors, they still are debating the precise standard of
liability, whether strict or knowledge, for cases of hostile environ-
ment harassment by supervisors. The EEOC Guidelines have pre-
vailed on a knowledge or constructive knowledge standard for
hostile environment sexual harassment by co-workers.
II. Anomalies
The behavior that women challenge under the rubric of sexual
harassment is usually despicable by any reasonable person's stan-
dards. Women should not be subjected to threats of firing or denial
of promotions based on refusals to have sexual relations with their
supervisors. Nor should they have to endure a general working en-
vironment suffused with verbal abuse, offensive physical contacts, or
obscene portrayals of themselves. However, to acknowledge the
outrageousness of much of the conduct that women find intolerable
is not to concede that a Title VII remedy is the apposite one. Sev-
eral anomalies in the present treatment of sexual harassment as Ti-
tle VII sex discrimination are worth exploring: (1) legislative intent,
that is, whether the framers of Title VII contemplated how the stat-
ute would be used; (2) the contention that sexual harassment is sex-
ual discrimination, both theoretically and within the meaning of
57. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
58. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68-9. Some commentators are disturbed that in articulating
the unwelcome/voluntary distinction, the Court stated that evidence of the victim's sex-
ually provocative speech or behavior would be relevant to determining welcomeness.
They view this as a likely means of discrediting the victim of sexual harassment, much as
rape victims are victimized further by trials which focus on their sexual history or dress.
345
Yale Law & Policy Review
Title VII; (3) employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisory
personnel and co-workers; and (4) the difficulty of distinguishing le-
gitimate intimate relations from sexual harassment in the workplace.
A. Legislative Intent
As the judges who rejected the earliest sexual harassment suits
pointed out, the legislative history of Title VII does not indicate that
Congress intended to address sexual abuses in the workplace. 59 In-
deed, the record is almost silent as to Congress' intent regarding the
ban on sexual discrimination itself: "sex" was added at the eleventh
hour by an opponent of the entire act, who intended thereby to
scuttle the Title, and received no relevant discussion. In all likeli-
hood, the members of that Congress would have been quite sur-
prised to learn that they had contemplated including sexual
harassment within the confines of sex discrimination-especially
since the term 'sexual harassment' did not come into currency until
the late 1970s. 60 They were fashioning a civil rights law-that is, one
addressing impediments to individuals as a result of discriminatory
acts-not a law proscribing just any kind of oppressive act that one
person might commit against another.
B. Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination
One should not place much credence on the absence of legislative
intent. If sexual harassment logically belongs within the broader
category of Title VII sex discrimination, then judges and commenta-
tors should be commended-not faulted-for making an astute con-
nection. This inclusion, however, seems an uneasy one at best. The
subsumption of sexual harassment under Title VII's ban on sex dis-
crimination in employment, though now accepted by courts as self-
evident, merits further consideration. 61 The pioneers for a Title VII
sexual harassment cause of action, Catharine A. MacKinnon princi-
pal among them,62 conceptualized sexual harassment as a wrong to
women as members of an oppressed and legally protected group.
59. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
60. C. MAcKINNON,.supra note 6, at 27 & n.13. In the note, she attributes early use of
the term to several sources, all writing in the period 1975-1976.
61. A good example of assertion rather than argument can be found in Vinson, 477
U.S. at 64: "'Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate be-
cause of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."




This section will reexamine these arguments and question the as-
sumptions behind the inclusion of sexual harassment under Title
VII.
The early partisans used sexual harassment as a metaphor for the
position of women in our male-dominated, capitalistic (i.e., exploita-
tive) society, and thus tended to view virtually all women as victims.
These partisans, often substantiating their claims with highly ques-
tionable statistical studies, 63 regard sexual harassment, like rape, as
a reification of male perfidy. While undeniably serving a useful and
necessary function in raising people's consciousness about offensive
behavior, these pioneers, as is the wont of pioneers in most things,
overstated their case.
MacKinnon's argument for sexual harassment as a metaphor for
capitalism is a case in point. For MacKinnon, sexual harassment is
"in essence a group injury"64 that women suffer because they are
women, regardless of their unique qualities, and that men perpe-
trate because they enjoy economic power over women. She writes:
Sexual harassment perpetuates the interlocked structure by which wo-
men have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the bottom of the
labor market. Two forces of American society converge: men's control
over women's sexuality and capital's control over employees' work
lives. Women historically have been required to exchange sexual serv-
ices for material survival, in one form or another. Prostitution and
marriage as well as sexual harassment in different ways institutionalize
this arrangement. 65
Stated more truculently, "Economic power is to sexual harassment
as physical force is to rape."'66
According to MacKinnon, women's roles in society are defined
largely by their sexuality. She therefore finds spurious the argu-
ment advanced in an early case that sexual harassment is a matter of
63. See Note, Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards of Hostile Working
Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REv. 441, 441 n.3 (1988), for citations to
studies on the prevalence of sexual harassment among women workers; Comment, Home
is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1061, for a
sexual harassment study in housing; L. FARLEY, supra note 6, at 18-27; C. MACKINNON,
supra note 6, at 25-32. In the Redbook study (Safran, Redbook Magazine, Nov. 1976 at 149),
which MacKinnon used as an illustration of the prevalence of sexual harassment, 92
percent of the respondents claimed to be victims of sexual harassment. The inference of
near universal victimhood seems highly questionable due to the self-selectivity of the
respondents. MacKinnon herself points this out--'That respondents were self-selected
is this study's most serious drawback." She does so, however, only in a footnote, leaving
the less industrious reader to draw an inference that almost every woman has suffered
this travail. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 25 & n. 1, 28-29.
64. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 172.
65. Id. at 174-75.
66. Id. at 217-18.
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sexuality rather than gender, and thus does not qualify as sex dis-
crimination.67 "Sexual harassment," she argues, "makes of women's
sexuality a badge of female servitude. ' 68 She thus considers it ludi-
crous to contend that a woman fired for refusing to have sex with
her supervisor is discharged for that refusal rather than for being a
woman. If particular women, whom men find attractive, are espe-
cially likely to trigger sexual harassment, this does not defeat the
argument that the harassment is essentially sex-based, and thus sex
discrimination. In MacKinnon's analysis, attractiveness is a "sex-
plus" criterion that merely serves to select some as victims and ex-
empt others. 69 Moreover, since women tend to be the victims of
sexual harassment, only women and not men must choose between
tolerating the harassment or suffering the consequences. MacKin-
non concludes that sexual harassment is discrimination in employ-
ment-it has an impact both on employment decisions and on the
general atmosphere of the workplace-and a "condition of work"
within the meaning of Title VII.
MacKinnon's argument comes freighted with excess ideological
baggage. Casting women in the guise of helpless victims, economi-
cally dependent upon men and thus pawns to men's sexual desires,
does little to bolster women's self-image or to inspire them to
breach male bastions. It casts women in a deterministic nexus of
economic powerlessness and physical weakness that, curiously, gives
them no recourse but to throw themselves on the mercy of male
judges enforcing legislation enacted by a male Congress. The argu-
ment seems vulnerable as well to a reductio ad absurdum in which
males, as well as females, could be viewed as the victims of roles
impressed upon them by the same capitalist system that allegedly
circumscribes women's choices: they are forced always to maintain
an aura of invincibility and machismo; to shoulder responsibility for
dependent women and children; to be enslaved to economic neces-
sity for most of their adult lives; and to die early for their efforts. 70
67. 14 at 189 (discussing Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 123, 124
(D.D.C. 1974)).
68. Id
69. By "sex-plus," MacKinnon means an added feature-attractiveness-in addition
to gender, the possession of which makes one more likely to end up as a victim of sexual
harassment. Her point is that "[t]he addition of the criterion of attractiveness does not,
as a doctrinal matter, defeat the argument that the treatment is sex-based." Id. at 190-
91.
70. For a fuller exposition of the problems of "victimology," see E. PAUL, Eq.urry




"Victimology" serves no purpose other than the propagandistic.
MacKinnon's argument, however, bereft of this ideological excres-
cence, does raise two points that merit scrutiny: sexual harassment
is essentially a group injury,7' and sexual harassment is sex discrimi-
nation within the scope of Title VII.
The "group injury" contention is questionable both on Title VII
and theoretical grounds. Disparate treatment lawsuits under Title
VII typically raise issues of discrimination in the policies of corpora-
tions or in the practices of key personnel that adversely affect partic-
ular plaintiffs simply because they fall within a protected group.
Rather than being judged on individual merit in the hiring or pro-
motion process, individuals are treated differently, and worse, than
others simply because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. The standard McDonnell Douglas evidentiary scheme assumes
situations where the claimant is denied a job or job benefit "due to
the bare fact of the claimant's membership in a disadvantaged
group? 2 Employers attempting to defend their practices and to re-
but a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination often will raise
issues bearing on the uniqueness of the particular person. Employ-
ers may argue, for example, that their refusal to hire or to promote
was the result not of a discriminatory animus against this person but
of a legitimate business judgment that she was not the most quali-
fied candidate.7"
Does sexual harassment conform to this disparate treatment para-
digm? The typical quid pro quo sexual harassment plaintiff com-
plains about behavior (i.e., practices) that a particular supervisor
directs at her. The complaint is never about a general policy of the
employer; indeed, what employer would be so foolish as to issue a
policy encouraging its supervisors to extort sexual favors for job
benefits? Thus, the typical quid pro quo incident needs to be com-
pared to the typical disparate treatment/practices incident. In the
former, a supervisor demands sexual favors in return for job bene-
fits because of sexual desire, and he selects his target because he
71. Others have argued for the group-injury contention. See Hughes & May, Sexual
Harassment, 6 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 249, 266 (1980).
72. Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
73. For a recent case, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). In
this case a woman was denied a partnership in an accounting firm, and the firm con-
tended that this denial was reached for legitimate reasons. The Court held that in such
"mixed-motives" cases-in which some of the reasons for denial may be legitimate and
others discriminatory-the defendant may prevail if he can show (after the plaintiff has
established her prima facie case) by a preponderance of the evidence that the same deci-
sion would have been reached absent the discriminatory element.
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finds her sexually attractive. In the latter, the supervisor refuses to
hire, to promote, or to reward a female employee as he would a
comparable male, because he has an animus of some sort against
women.
What is missing from the former and is present in the latter is an
essential attribute of discrimination: that is, that any member of the
scorned group will trigger the response of the person who practices
discrimination. Nazis despised all Jews, not just those with certain
attributes; South African apartheid is directed at all Blacks, not just
those with certain features; Jim Crow laws were aimed at all Blacks.
Discrimination, concededly, is difficult to define, but one of its es-
sential attributes is that it fastens upon all members of the group to
be scorned (or devalued by a negative stereotype). Thus, something
essentially different from discrimination in this classic sense seems
to be occurring in quid pro quo sexual harassment. Attempting to
overcome this difference, as MacKinnon tries, with the device of
"sex-plus," does not eliminate the fact that the discriminator scorns
or devalues all members of a group, while the sexual harasser only
targets someone whom he finds attractive. While it is undoubtedly
true that many practitioners of sexual harassment are recidivists,
their targets are not just any female simply because she is female.
Hostile environment plaintiffs complain of offensive overtures,
comments, or gestures of a sexual nature directed at them by super-
visors or co-workers. While they sometimes allege that other wo-
men in the workplace also are abused, behavior that reaches the
threshold of pervasiveness and seriousness for Title VII purposes is
limited to discrete individuals. Admittedly, this becomes a bit
murky in factories, for example, where only one or two women have
breached a formerly male enclave; if they suffer harassment, then all
women suffer harassment. These unique (or what philosophers call
the "lifeboat") cases are not paradigmatic; typically, many women
work together and only one or some may suffer flagrantly intolera-
ble treatment.7 4
As late as 1985, Judge Bork voiced a similar criticism of the sexual
harassment paradigm. He favored the line of argument taken in the
74. Curiously, the above argument for the denial of hostile environment sexual har-
assment as sex discrimination seems to be weaker than the quid pro quo argument. The
objectionable conduct in hostile environment may be more widespread, may affect more
than one woman (especially when perpetrated by co-workers), and possibly may have
more than one offender. Also, while employers never have policies encouraging this
type of behavior, they are more likely to be aware of it than in quid pro quo cases. This




earliest sexual harassment cases: "Congress was not thinking of in-
dividual harassment at all but of discrimination in conditions of em-
ployment because of gender, ' 75 when it enacted Tide VII. He
found it peculiar that the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia had stated twice before that Tide VII does not prohibit sex-
ual harassment by a bisexual supervisor if he demanded sexual
favors of both males and females. 76 In judge Bork's view, the classi-
fication of sexual advances as discrimination was awkward. While he
considered harassment to be reprehensible, he noted that "Title VII
was passed to outlaw discriminatory behavior and not simply behav-
ior of which we strongly disapprove." 77
Indeed, the bisexual supervisor does raise a perplexing doctrinal
anomaly. The identical offense is sex discrimination under Title VII
when perpetrated by a man against a woman, by a man against a
man, by woman against a woman, or by a woman against a man; yet,
if a bisexual of either sex preys equally upon men and women, he (or
she) is beyond the reach of Title VII. The law is supposed to look to
acts, whether criminal or tortious, to determine culpability and not
to the individual characteristics of the perpetrators: that is precisely
what is meant by the rule of law. 78 Yet, if sexual harassment is sexual
still seem to be most comfortable with them. Perhaps judges are reacting more to the
outrageousness of the quid pro quo offenders' conduct than to doctrinal niceties.
Some hostile environment cases seem closer to quid pro quo, in that co-workers har-
ass one woman with unwelcome sexual overtures, and would, thus, succumb to the argu-
ments made against quid pro quo. See, e.g., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp.
22 (D. Neb. 1983). In this case the plaintiff alleged that two co-workers repeatedly sub-
jected her to physical and verbal abuse while all three were at a weekend training ses-
sion. These kinds of cases fall afoul of the same objections as the quid pro quo cases:
they do not fit well under the rubric of sex discrimination. There are some fact patterns,
however, that seem closer to classic Title VII sex discrimination. See, e.g., Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984). Here, co-workers in a factory used
sexual innuendos, exposed body parts, and displayed sexually derogatory posters appar-
ently in an effort to drive a woman worker from their male bastion. It seems at least
debatable that they would have treated any woman in the same fashion (although the
company argued otherwise, contending that the incidents arose from a personality clash
among the workers, for when Zabkowicz first was hired she was not so treated, and the
harassment occurred only after her brother-in-law joined the workforce). If so, this
would fulfill the universality criterion of discrimination. Thus, curiously, hostile envi-
ronment cases of the latter sort are more compatible with Title VII analysis than quid
pro quo, even though the latter is the classic sexual harassment paradigm that the courts
accepted earlier and with more certainty.
75. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F. 2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting)
(denial of en banc rehearing).
76. Id The cases were Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
and Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7. The same point was made in Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.l 1 (1Ith Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 1333 n.7.
78. A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTrr ON, 114
(1885, 1982):
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discrimination under Title VII, why are some perpetrators insu-
lated? A savvy harasser need only note this anomaly and become an
equal opportunity harasser.
Taking the point one step further, it also seems peculiar to call
sexual harassment of a male by a male, or a female by a female, sex
discrimination.7 9 In these scenarios a male (or a female) is selecting
a member of his (or her) own sex (i.e., his or her own group on the
group-injury model) for harassment. How can this be discrimina-
tion? Discrimination, as this Article has defined it, is harming some-
one or denying someone a benefit because that person is a member
of a group that the discriminator despises. What the harasser is re-
ally doing is preferring or selecting some one member of his gender for
sexual attention, however unwelcome that attention may be to its
object. He certainly does not despise the entire group, nor does he
wish to harm its members, since he is a member himself and finds
others of the group sexually attractive. Virtually all Title VII suits
deal with intergroup discrimination,"0 and not, as here, with com-
plaints within a group. Homosexual sexual harassment-viewed as
in some sense a preference phenomenon in which the harasser pre-
fers, first, his own sex, and then a particular member-raises the
larger issue of whether it makes sense to characterize the archetypi-
cal case of male to female harassment as discrimination, rather than
as a preference, albeit misguided and objectionable.
Individual acts of sex discrimination fall into the following pat-
tern: A refuses to do X for B because B is a member of group Y
(where X stands for hire, promote, etc. and Y stands for blacks, wo-
men, etc.). Sexual harassment of the classic, quid pro quo type does
not fit this pattern, but another: A refuses to do X for B unless B
We mean... when we speak of the "rule of law" as a characteristic of our country,
not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that
here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.
In England the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjection of all classes
to one law administered by the ordinary Courts, has been pushed to its utmost limit.
With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of
taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification
as any other citizen.
79. Homosexual sexual harassment has been recognized judicially as sex discrimina-
tion within the purview of Title VII. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, 511 F.
Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
80. A black woman of light skin has brought suit recently under Title VII against a
darker skinned supervisor, claiming racial discrimination. Even this is more like tradi-
tional intergroup discrimination with the simple addition that there can be disfavored
subgroups within larger despised groups. "Attractiveness," however, is too subjective




provides A with sexual favors. In sexual harassment, it is not simply
the "bare fact" of B's existence as a Y that triggers A's oppressive
conduct, but B's unwillingness to do something, namely to provide
sexual favors. Thus, sexual harassment seems to be hitched uneas-
ily to Title VII's sex discrimination cart. One need not be convinced
entirely of this disanalogy to realize that there may be a more doctri-
nally felicitous means of remedying sexual harassment than the
present jury-rigged arrangement.
C. Employer Liability
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson the Supreme Court declined an
invitation to hand down a definitive ruling on the issue of employer
liability. Instead, the Court suggested, as the EEOC had in its amicus
curiae brief, that lower courts look to traditional agency principles.
Apparently, the Court intended that lower courts apply this inquiry
in all categories of sexual harassment, not only the hostile-environ-
ment-harassment-by-a-supervisor type treated in the Vinson case.8
An examination of agency principles, however, reveals a striking
anomaly in the current liability rules: 82 namely, the current Title VII
paradigm holds employers liable for damages even though they are
ancillary victims to sexual harassment.
The EEOC Guidelines form the backdrop for judicial decisions on
employer liability. For infractions by supervisory personnel, they
state:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is responsible
for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with re-
spect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts com-
plained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of
their occurrence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of
81. The EEOC in its amicus brief contended that in formulating all employer liability
rules regarding sexual harassment agency principles ought to be consulted. The Court's
language is not altogether clear on whether it intended the examination of agency prin-
ciples to apply just to settling the liability issue with respect to hostile environment sex-
ual harassment by supervisors or to all categories of sexual harassment. "We therefore
decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but we do
agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for gui-
dance in this area," Justice Rehnquist wrote. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 72 (1986). This wording suggests that the Court, like the EEOC in its amicus brief,
intended the examination of agency principles to apply to all categories of sexual
harassment.
82. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text for discussion of the current rules
and the controversy over strict liability versus knowledge in regard to sexual harassment
of the hostile environment type when perpetrated by supervisors.
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the particular employment relationship and the job functions per-
formed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in
either a supervisory or agency capacity.83
The Guidelines impose a less rigorous standard of employer liability
for the harassing conduct of co-workers: the employer is liable when
it "knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."8' 4 Courts
generally have followed the EEOC's lead, although some judges
have balked at imposing strict liability for hostile environment har-
assment by supervisors. The Supreme Court in Vinson found the
facts in the case to be too unsettled to warrant a definitive ruling on
employer liability. Thus, the majority merely noted its agreement
with the EEOC's amicus brief's position that Congress intended for
courts to look to agency principles for guidance.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency 85 hinges employer liability on
whether or not the servant's act falls within the "scope of employ-
ment." Not every act committed by an employee in an authorized
place and within working hours falls within the scope of employ-
ment. The act will trigger employer liability only if the employer
has authorized it, or if it somehow furthers the employer's busi-
ness.86 Prosser remarks that the term "scope of employment" is
"highly indefinite" and "so devoid of meaning in itself that its very
vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flex-
ibility in decisions." 87 The modern tendency, he continues, is to
view even intentional torts of servants as the employer's responsibil-
ity where the purpose of the misdeed "is wholly or in part to further
the master's business." 88 However, if the agent acts from purely
personal motives that are in no way connected to the business, the
employer is not liable, unless the agent appears to be acting within
the scope of the employer's authority.
In Horn v. Duke Homes,89 a quid pro quo case, the Seventh Circuit
explained its use of respondeat superior, the practice of holding em-
ployers liable for certain employee acts, in sexual harassment cases.
Duke Homes contended that it was not responsible, unless notified,
for an intentional act of sex discrimination for private gratification.
The court rejected this argument as a "reification of the company."
83. Guidelines, supra note 3, at § 1604.11(c).
84. Id. § 1604.11(d).
85. See supra note 55, at § 29.
86. Id.
87. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 70 (1984).
88. lId




Although courts routinely impose liability on principals for the in-
tentional torts of their agents, the court acknowledged that the prac-
tice is "rarely justified." The modem cases implicitly rely on a "risk
allocation theory" of the corporation as the most efficient risk
avoider or risk insurer. The company, rather than an innocent
party, should bear the costs of employees' torts as an incident to
doing business when these acts are reasonably foreseeable. This is
essentially an efficiency argument, for which the court proffered a
policy justification:
[S]ex discrimination can best be eradicated by enforcing a strict liabil-
ity rule that ensures compensation for victims and creates an incentive
for the employer to take the strongest possible affirmative measures to
prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors (citation
omitted) .90
From there it is a short step to adopting Title VII's and the
EEOC's strict liability rule for supervisory employees. The same
risk allocation theory that has prompted modem courts to adopt re-
spondeat superior also justifies shrinking the scope-of-employment ex-
ception. When the employer delegated supervisory power to the
future harasser, it merged with him "as long as the tort complained
of was caused by the exercise of this supervisory power."9 1 There-
fore, the Horn court dismissed the countervailing argument that the
harasser's conduct was unauthorized and unconnected to the well-
being of the business.
Respondeat superior-which encourages plaintiffs to seek defendants
with deep pockets-is a doctrine that has caused much havoc, partic-
ularly in the arena of product liability.92 Modem infatuation with it
results from judicial sympathy for victims and from a view of corpo-
rations as virtually bottomless money pits. The original common
law notion was that respondeat superior imposed liability on employers
for the acts of their servants (or agents) because the servants acted,
in a certain sense, in the employer's stead. The modem view, how-
ever, as articulated in Horn, has drifted far from the philosophical
moorings of agency principles in individual rights. From an individ-
ual-rights perspective, each person is free to make choices and is
responsible for those choices. In addition, each person ought to be
held responsible for the natural consequences of his acts and of the
acts of others whom he delegates to function in his place. In con-
trast, he ought not to be held liable for those acts of others that he
90. Id at 605 (citation omitted).
91. Id
92. See P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
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has not authorized, or acts that are not reasonably foreseeable from
the acts that he has authorized. Traditiona*l agency principles incor-
porate this individual-rights perspective-specifically, in their no-
tions of responsibility, delegation of responsibility, and "scope of
employment."
More recently, however, utilitarianism-or efficiency, a modem
variant 93-has replaced rights as the foundation and rationale for
respondeat superior, thus greatly enlarging its sweep. The judges who
heard the earlier cases remained unpersuaded that sexual harass-
ment was anything but a "personal proclivity."94 Harassment pro-
vided no conceivable benefit to the employer, as did discriminatory
policies that employers defended in typical Title VII cases.95 Con-
temporary judges see the matter in an entirely different light.
Perhaps the early judges grasped something that has eluded their
successors. When a supervisor threatens a subordinate with repri-
sals if she declines his sexual advances, there is one obvious victim
of his threat: the woman. But the employer is another, almost uni-
versally unacknowledged victim. If a supervisor uses his delegated,
discretionary powers to assess, to promote, and to reward the com-
pany's employees on a purely extraneous criterion-sexual acquies-
cence-he impairs the efficiency of the company, discredits the
company's name, and damages company morale. The manager, in
making a promise-of unjustified rewdrd for sex, attempts to bribe
the woman with the employer's assets. What justice is there in im-
posing a further burden on one of the victims (the company) to
compensate the other victim (the female employee) for the unau-
thorized and counter-productive actions of the sexually harassing
supervisor?
93. Judge Richard A. Posner, of course, has been instrumental in promoting eco-
nomic (i.e., efficiency) considerations in the law. See R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw (1972). See also E. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 218-24 (1987)
(analysis of Posner's more recent writings).
94. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
95. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(Employer policy of unequal pension contributions by male and female workers violated
Title VII despite employer's rationale that actuarial tables show that women live longer);
Torres v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Services, No. 86-2161 (7th Cir. Oct. 17,
1988) (en banc), cerL denied, 109 S.Ct. 1133 (1989) (state successfully defended prison
policy of requiring use of only women guards in the living quarters of female prisoners
against Title VII challenge); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 216
(7th Cir. 1987); LeBeau v. L.O.F. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1054 (7th Cir.
1986) (employer's policy of only hiring hourly factory workers over 5'4" tall and at least
110 pounds was held to be a violation of Title VII); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1862 (3rd Cir. 1985) (employers successfully




Only a utilitarian or efficiency principle-such as cheapest cost
avoider-would lead to imposing a liability-without-knowledge stan-
dard on the employer. From an individual-rights perspective, the
employer is an ancillary victim of the harassment. Once apprised of
the offense by the primary victim, an employer, out of pure self-
interest, ought to investigate the matter, discipline the supervisor,
and fire him for further violations. Only if the employer fails to do
this may the company reasonably be viewed as sharing complicity in
the offensive behavior.
The current liability rules, as embodied in the EEOC Guidelines
and accepted in large part by the courts, contain one particularly
odd anomaly. While strict liability for sexual harassment by supervi-
sors is the rule, employers are least likely to know of this kind of
behavior since quid pro quo threats are seldom announced over the
company loudspeaker. For hostile environment harassment, which
is often more public, employers are held to the lesser standard of
knowledge or constructive knowledge. 96
It seems bizarre to interpret the power that an employer gives a
manager to hire, fire, and promote employees to include such fla-
grant abuses of trust as sexual harassment-the use of company re-
sources in an entirely unauthorized manner for one's own personal
pleasure. Victims, too, must realize that a supervisor is not pursuing
company policy when he makes such threats. If there is any mean-
ing left in the "scope of employment" exception, it should exempt
the employer from liability for sexual harassment of which he has
had no notice.
D. Intimate Private Relations or Sexual Harassment
Some sexual overtures in the workplace are perfectly legitimate.
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to predict beforehand whether
an invitation for intimacy is going to be welcome or not. Mixed sig-
nals, gamesmanship (or gameswomanship), and changes of heart
are features of male-female relations. Office romances are common-
place, especially now that women increasingly populate the
workforce. Frustrated, would-be, jilted, and jealous lovers all have
been known to behave in the ways that plaintiffs complain of in sex-
ual harassment suits. Thus, sexual harassment stands as a correlate
to legitimate behavior of a private and sexual nature that could be
initiated in the workplace.
96. See supra note 74, which. discusses an analogous anomaly in the sexual harass-
ment as sex discrimination paradigm.
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Commentators have wrestled with the problem of distinguishing
sexual harassment from legitimate sexual overtures, but their efforts
have not been particularly successful. Susan Dodds, in proposing a
behavioral account, writes that, "There is something intrinsically
different about the two kinds of activity." 97 She urges that one ought
to be alert to risks and seek appropriate evidence from the other
person's behavior when making sexual offers. Her argument, how-
ever, is circular: if actions typical of a sexual harasser define sexual
harassment, then how does one determine in the first instance what
these actions are? Hughes and May offer a more concrete distinc-
tion between coercive and "sincere" sexual offers: the latter prom-
ise benefits that are not a condition of employment success. Given
the difficulty of separating "sincere" offers from coercive offers in
the business environment, the authors recommend that one err on
the side of avoiding potentially harassing conduct; one should re-
frain from making any overtures at work if one is in a relationship of
unequal power.98 This recommendation might be feasible in a
world populated by asexual creatures, but it is of limited use in
drawing a bright line between harmless office flirtations and sexual
harassment.
Nancy Brown points to another difficulty in the task of line-draw-
ing.99 Men and women diverge in their perceptions of what consti-
tutes acceptable behavior and what slips over the line into
harassment. A man accused of sexual harassment typically either
denies that the event occurred or admits to the conduct but claims
that it was harmless and that the woman misinterpreted his intent.
When the offensive behavior is of the hostile environment sort-
e.g., sexual overtures without explicit threats of reprisal, lewd com-
ments, language laden with sexual innuendos, sexual jokes-men
may believe sincerely that their conduct falls within the bounds of
generally acceptable male deportment.
Concerns such as these have prompted some commentators to
suggest that the courts ought to adopt an objective victim standard
in assessing cases of sexual harassment, particularly those of the
hostile environment genre: "The standard would assess behavior
97. Dodds, Frost, Pargetter, & Prior, Sexual Harassment, 14 Soc. THEORY AND PRAC.
111, 121 (1988). See also Comment, Employer Beware of "Hostile Environment" Sexual Har-
assment, 26 Dug. L. REv. 461, 473-4 (1987).
98. Hughes & May, supra note 71, at 253, 272.




from the viewpoint of the ordinary reasonable person in the particu-
lar employment setting of the plaintiff." 100 This proposal would re-
spond to the problems of distinguishing acceptable from
unacceptable behavior.
In addition to these epistemological questions there is another
problem: what about workplace environments that have been and
still are infused with sexual banter and crude language that is inof-
fensive to male workers but disconcerting to their new female asso-
ciates? As the district judge observed in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
C0. :101
[T]he standard for determining sex harassment would be different de-
pending upon the work environment. Indeed, it cannot seriously be
disputed that in some work environments, humor and language are
rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversation and girlie
magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change
this .... [Title VII was not designed] to bring about magical transfor-
mation in the social mores of American workers. 0 2
The court recommended applying an objective test of the "average
female employee" in order to assess whether a working environ-
ment is "offensive." Yet, as the quotation above indicates, even
under an "objective" standard, judges will have to make close judg-
ment calls about when they think women ought to be offended and
when not. Thus, an objective victim standard cannot eliminate en-
tirely the need for discretion on the part ofjudges. They must de-
termine when behavior constitutes actionable sexual harassment
and when it is only a harm without any available legal remedy.
III. Is There a Better Way?
In recent years, some plaintiffs have appended tort claims to their
Title VII suits, and federal courts have exercised pendent jurisdic-
tion to hear these state, common law grievances. Torts that have
accompanied Title VII sexual harassment claims include wrongful
100. Comment, supra note 97, at 478. See also Holtzman & Trelz, Recent Developments
in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son. 31 ST. Louis U.LJ. 239, 259 (1987). Contra Comment, supra note 63 (recom-
mending a subjective standard).
101. 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (a hostile environment case in which the
plaintiff complained of vulgar language and occasional displays of pictures of nude or
partially clad women).
102. Id. at 430. The judge recommended an objective test for determining the "of-
fensive work environment" prong of the prima fade case, that is, a standard of the "av-
erage female employee." Id at 433.
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discharge, 0 3 invasion of the right to privacy,' 0 4 interference with
contract, intentional assault and battery, interference with a contrac-
tual relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 05
Given the problems in the sexual-harassment-as-sexual-discrimina-
tion theory indicated in Section II, a tort may have two advantages:
(1) it offers greater doctrinal coherence; and (2) it offers plaintiffs
compensatory and punitive damages, which are currently unavaila-
ble under Title VII. 106
Some commentators oppose tort remedies for sexual harassment
because they consider the problem societal-not personal. Not sur-
prisingly, Catharine A. MacKinnon spearheaded this resistance.
"[B]y treating the incidents as if they are outrages particular to an
individual woman," she wrote, "rather than integral to her social
status as a woman worker, the personal approach on the legal level
fails to analyze the relevant dimensions of the problem." 0 7 Another
commentator agrees, arguing that under tort law sexual harassment
would be viewed merely as an affront to an individual's dignity.
Such an approach would overlook the primary affront, that "sexual
harassment injures a discrete and identifiable group by subjecting
its victims to demeaning treatment and relegating them to inferior
status in the workplace."' 0 8
These objections, once again, highlight the differences between a
group-discrimination approach and an individualist approach that
stresses the victim's rights to privacy, to freedom from physical as-
sault or the threat of it, and to freedom from the infliction of severe
emotional distress.' 0 9 An individual-rights perspective calls for vin-
dicating these rights, while a group-rights approach subsumes the
victim's rights under a diffuse claim of affront to all of womankind.
103. See Clay v. Quartet Manufacturing, 644 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (plaintiff's
claim failed because she was at-will employee).
104. See Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981) (Ti-
tle VII case that recognized claim for invasion of privacy).
105. See Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 677 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Porta v.
Rollins Environmental Services, 654 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1987); Clay v. Quartet Manu-
facturing, 644 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F. 2d 1202
(8th Cir. 1984) (cases involving claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress as
the result of sexual harassment).
106. Some state employment discrimination laws provide victims with compensatory
and punitive damages in addition to equitable remedies. California, Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, and Minnesota are examples. See also Civil Rights Act of 1990 supra note 12.
107. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 88.
108. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1463 (1984).
109. These rights are logical corollaries, embodied in the tort law, from the tradi-
tional, Lockean natural rights of life, liberty, and estate (property), or in the Jeffersonian




This group-rights approach, if carried to its logical extreme, would
make of each of us a victim of every criminal act-every robbery,
assault, murder-thus vitiating the rights of the actual victim.
By contrast, a tort approach would remain true to an individual-
rights perspective by focusing on the individual harm to the victim
and the individual liability of the harasser. The tort approach would
also place all similar behavior under the same theoretical umbrella.
Sexually offensive behavior occurs in settings other than the work-
place-in universities, housing, and ordinary social situations of all
sorts. When such behavior becomes egregious, plaintiffs should
have a remedy, and a tort would allow courts to treat all sexual
harassment alike. Moreover, a new state tort of sexual harassment,
created by judicial construction or legislative craftsmanship, would
be preferable to the doctrinal and theoretical confusion that the sex-
ual-harassment-as-sexual-discrimination theory has engendered.110
Rather than forcing sexual harassment to lie on the Procrustean bed
of Title VII disparate-treatment sexual discrimination, a new tort
could be crafted to the dimensions of the victims.
A tort of sexual harassment could be patterned after the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which in most states par-
allels Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' 11 "[M]ere in-
sults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other
trivialities" will not suffice to generate liability, for plaintiffs must be
"hardened to a certain amount of rough language" and the occa-
sional inconsiderate or unkind remark." 2
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all pos-
sible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in
which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the commu-
nity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, "Outrageous."' 13
Emotional distress must be "so severe that no reasonable man could
be expected to endure it."' 14 To trigger liability, the "extreme and
outrageous" conduct must be committed either intentionally or
recklessly; the perpetrator is then responsible for any emotional dis-
tress or bodily harm that may result. Thus, as one district judge put
110. Sexual harassment would be exclusively a state question, removing the federal
courts from involvement, as discussed below.
I ll. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
112. Id. at § 46 comment a.
113. Id.
114. Id. at § 46 commentj.
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it, the tort has three elements: the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous; it must be done intentionally or recklessly; and it must
cause severe emotional distress.' 1 5
A tort of sexual harassment, patterned on the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, would look something like this:
(1) Sexual harassment is comprised of
(a) unwelcome sexual propositions incorporating overt or implicit
threats of reprisal, and/or
(b) other sexual overtures or conduct so persistent and offensive
that a reasonable person when apprised of the conduct would find it
extreme and outrageous.
(2) To be held liable, the harasser must have acted either intentionally
or recklessly and the victim must have suffered, thereby, economic det-
riment and/or extreme emotional distress.
(3) In the employment context,
(a) the employer is liable when the plaintiff had notified an appropri-
ate officer of the company (not himself the alleged harasser) of the
offensive conduct, and the employer failed to take good faith action
to forestall future incidents;
(b) The employer is liable, also, when he should have known of the
offending incident(s) (that is, when he failed to provide an appropri-
ate complaint mechanism).
Element (1) defines sexual harassment to include both the quid
pro quo and the hostile environment types.. The new tort would use
a reasonable person standard for hostile environment claims, which
would prevent ultra-sensitive plaintiffs from prevailing on evidence
of conduct that is generally acceptable, although not particularly de-
sirable, in the prevailing social milieu. 16 The requirement in (1)(b)
that the conduct be "persistent and offensive" would eliminate suits
based on casual or incidental insults; it would be difficult for offen-
sive language, dirty jokes, or displays of pictures of naked women to
rise above this threshold. A threshold is desirable, for it curtails
frivolous suits and dissuades those who encourage virtually all wo-
men to view themselves as victims. To see all women as victims of
115. Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter, 677 F. Supp. 307, 309 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
116. This "reasonable person" standard (termed an "objective standard" by the
commentators) is nothing more than the old "reasonable man" standard transmuted
into nonsexist language. "Reasonable person" is preferable in any case to reasonable
man, since women, obviously, form the bulk of the victims. A subjective standard, in
which the court would have to assess the sensitivity of the victim before it in each case,
lends itself to greater arbitrariness-that is, case-by-case fluctuations in which some vic-
tims recover damages and others do not even though the harassment they suffered looks
almost identical. An objective standard conforms better to the rule of law notion that
like cases ought to be treated the same. A "reasonable woman" standard would rule out
the claims of male victims of sexual harassment, thus again violating the rule of law




sexual harassment is, in effect, to see none. As one commentator
wrote: "each insult or sexist remark should not create a cause of
action.... Suffice it to say that a small degree of thick skin is proba-
bly required, on the part of everyone."' 17
Element (2) holds the harasser liable if he (or she) acts intention-
ally or recklessly. In quid pro quo cases, a court should infer such
motivation or lack of care from the act itself; in hostile environment
cases, the court should infer it if the act breaches the "extreme and
outrageous" threshold. Also, the victim must show that she (or he)
has sustained verifiable harm. The final element, (3), attempts to
remedy the various theoretical problems with employer liability in
the sexual harassment arena raised earlier." l8 Employers would be
liable under (3)(a) if, once given notice, they failed to take reason-
able measures to insure that the outrageous conduct would not be
repeated. The employer can escape liability if it makes good faith
efforts, since no one can predict the proper deterrent for every har-
asser. Placing the onus on the victim to notify her employer may
seem harsh, but it has a side benefit: the notification requirement
tells women to take responsibility for their own lives and not to fall
into a "helpless victim syndrome." Naturally, if the employer has
neither an officer charged with receiving such complaints nor a re-
view process, the company is more likely to be held liable; under
such circumstances, (3)(b) holds the employer to a constructive
knowledge standard.
The new scheme would encourage companies to provide an effec-
tive mechanism for dealing with sexual harassment. A few large
compensatory and even punitive damage awards would send a
louder message than EEOC conciliation sessions or a few small
awards of back pay after years of litigation. And in contrast to Tide
VII, the new tort would place the onus for sexual harassment
squarely on the perpetrator. It thus would send a clear, unmixed
message that such conduct is unacceptable in our society and that
those who practice such behavior will suffer the full consequences.
Finally, the new tort, which emanates from the individual-rights per-
spective, would encourage victims to object vigorously to acts of
sexual harassment to their employers and, if this fails to remedy the
problem, to vindicate their rights in court.
117. Comment, supra note 97, at 469-70.
118. See supra Section H(C), notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
363
Yale Law & Policy Review
IV. Conclusion
Including sexual harassment claims under the ban on sex discrim-
ination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is problematic for
several principal reasons. No legislative history warrants such an in-
terpretation. Sexual harassment differs in fundamental ways from
disparate treatment sex discrimination. Strict employer liability for
sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees is inequi-
table because it punishes one of the victims (the employer) rather
than placing the responsibility on the perpetrator. Finally, sexual
harassment is sometimes difficult to distinguish from acceptable sex-
ual overtures.
Years ofjudicial interpretation have transformed Title VII. In the
process it has strayed from its original philosophical moorings in the
vindication of individual rights and in the goal of a color-blind soci-
ety.1 9 The victims and perpetrators of sexual harassment are dis-
crete, identifiable individuals. Unless a group-injury model of
sexual harassment (with all of its ideological ramifications) is defen-
sible-and this Article has argued it is not-the courts, by accepting
such suits as cognizable under Title VII, have unwittingly imported
philosophical assumptions from a radical agenda that characterizes
all women as victims and all men as oppressors.
These defects in Title VII call out for an alternative. Tort law
could offer a more propitious remedy for unwelcome sexual imposi-
tions in the workplace (and elsewhere). The new tort of sexual har-
assment proposed in this Article has several advantages over the
present Title VII doctrinal muddle: (1) it is theoretically consistent,
always a good thing in itself; (2) it gets the federal courts out of what
is essentially a personal matter between individuals; (3) it provides
more compelling incentives to employers to both discourage such
conduct and discipline transgressors; (4) it places fault where fault
truly lies-with the perpetrator-rather than with the employer; (5)
119. This evolution is ably explicated in H. BELZ, REDEFINING EQUALITY: AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN (forthcoming 1990). Preferential treatment of
designated groups-Blacks, women, Latinos, Asians, etc.-is defensible only on a
group-injury model, and as Belz demonstrates, the original proponents of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 did not endorse such a philosophical underpinning. Rather, they
wanted to promote a society in which all individuals would enjoy civil rights equally,
irrespective of race, nationality, or creed (and as an incidental inclusion, gender). One
had civil rights, according to the original understanding of equality, because one was a
person, not because one was a member of a formerly oppressed and now legally pro-
tected and preferred group. For another discussion of the meaning of equality in dis-
crimination law, see Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the




it discourages frivolous suits and compensates more completely true
victims of outrageous conduct; (6) it signals to women, the usual
victims of sexual harassment, that they should take responsibility for
their lives by bringing complaints to the attention of their employ-
ers; (7) it names the offense appropriately as sexual harassment
rather than as sex discrimination, an awkward appellation at best;
and, finally, (8) it handles like conduct alike regardless of its social
setting.
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